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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court by 
section 78-2a-3(2)(h), Utah Code Annotated. This appeal 
is from a final order of the Third Judicial District 
Court in Salt Lake County, Utah. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Is notice to a partnership or its non-
debtor partners required before a charging order may be 
i 
issued against a judgment debtor who is also a partner? 
2. Is a court empowered to order the 
production of partnership tax records and other records 
of the partnership as a necessary adjunct to its author-
ity to issue charging orders? 
3. Does a charging order entail the procedural 
requirements of a motion for summary judgment? 
STATUTES TO BE INTERPRETED 
Utah Code Annotated 
48-1-16: Partnership books. 
The partnership books shall be keptf subject 
to any agreement between the partners, at the principal 
place of business of the partnership, and every partner 
shall at all times have access to and may inspect and 
copy any of them. 
48-1-19: Right to an account. 
Any partner shall have the right to a formal 
account as to partnership affairs: 
(1) If he is wrongfully excluded from the 
partnership business or possession of its property by his 
copartners. 
(2) If the right exists under the terms of any 
agreement. 
(3) As provided by Section 48-1-18. 
(4) Whenever other circumstances render it 
just and reasonable. 
48-1-25: Partner's interest subject to charging 
order. 
(1) On due application to a competent court 
by any judgment creditor of a partner the court which 
entered the judgment, order, or decree, or any other 
ii 
court, may charge the interest of the debtor partner with 
payment of the unsatisfied amount of such judgment debt 
with interest thereon and may . . . make all other 
orders, directives, accounts and inquiries which the 
debtor partner might have made or which the circumstances 
of the case may require. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the case 
The plaintiffs, Crayton and Jeanne Walker 
(hereafter "Walker") obtained a stipulated judgment 
against Gerald H. Bagley (hereafter "Bagley"), then 
sought and were granted a charging order against the 
interest of Bagley in a partnership known as Jordan 
Acres. Bagley opposed the motion, alleging that the 
order was too broad, that there was no affidavit or other 
evidence regarding the existence of the partnership or 
Bagley's interest in it, and that the partnership was not 
joined or given notice of the motion for the charging 
order. Bagley now appeals the entry of the charging 
order by the lower court. 
Statement of the Facts 
The Walkers initially obtained a default 
judgment against Bagley on June 28, 1985. (R. 20-21). 
However, that judgment was set aside in favor of the 
parties' stipulation to the entry of an amended judgment 
against Bagley in the amount of $7500.00. The stipula-
tion was entered on January 23, 1986. (R. 70). 
Some two years later, on February 4, 1988, Walker filed 
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a motion for a charging order against the interest of 
Bagley in the Jordan Acres Partnership. (R. 82). On 
June 24, 1988f the lower court granted the motion and 
entered the charging order, notwithstanding Bagley's 
objections as noted above. (R. 121-3). In addition to 
Bagley"s share of the profits and surplus of the partner-
ship itself, the order mandates disclosure of all assets 
sold or transferred by the partnership after the entry 
of the judgment, the partnership's tax returns for the 
years 1985 through 1987, and payment of "all profits, 
income, payments from the Partnership payable to Gerald 
Bagley and any right of any kind to receive any asset 
from the Partnership, regardless of whether distributed 
from capital, profits, or surplus, or as an expense of 
the Partnership." 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I. The Utah Uniform Partnership Act, 
which is found in Title 48 of the Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 as amended, allows a judgment creditor to obtain a 
charging order against the interest of his debtor in a 
partnership. A charging order does not operate against 
the partnership or the non-debtor partners, and therefore 
2 
does not require that notice be given to them before the 
order may be issued. 
Point II. Appellant's comparison of a motion 
to obtain a charging order to a motion for summary 
judgment has no basis in law, and should be rejected by 
this court. 
Point III. The charging order sought and 
obtained was not overly broad. It merely empowered the 
court, and the Walkers, to obtain information to which 
Bagley already had unlimited access. It was reasonable 
in its scope, seeking as it did information regarding the 
extent of Bagley1s interest in the partnership, which was 
essential in order to apply that interest toward 
satisfaction of the judgment. Moreover, the charging 
order amounts to a lien rather than an assignment, and 
the statutory procedures governing the assignment of 
partnership interests have no bearing on the present 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTAH UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THAT OTHER PARTNERS
 r OR THE PARTNERSHIP, 
BE GIVEN NOTICE WHEN A CHARGING ORDER IS SOUGHT. 
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Section 48-1-25 of the Utah Code provides that 
a partner's interest in a partnership is subject to a 
charging order, issued "on due application" by a judgment 
creditor of the debtor partner to a court of competent 
jurisdiction. The purpose of such an order is to make 
the debtor's share of partnership profits and surpluses 
available for the satisfaction of judgments against him. 
A charging order against the partnership interest of the 
debtor partner does not operate against the partnership 
itself; nor does it apply to partnership property as 
such. 
In this appeal, Bagley seeks to invalidate the 
charging order, partly on the ground that the other 
partners, and the partnership entity, were not given 
proper notice of the hearing on Walker's motion. 
However, the Uniform Partnership Act does not require 
that such notice be given; and the case of Phillips v. 
Phillips, 400 P. 2d 450 (Colo. 1964), which is relied 
upon by Bagley to show that the mailing of a notice to 
the attorney for the debtor-partner was insufficient 
notice under the Act, is not applicable to the present 
case. In Phillips, Lilian Phillips was the partner 
against whom the charging order was sought. Nothing was 
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said in the opinion about the need to notify any other 
partners, and the notice giving rise to the appeal was 
sent to Lilian's former attorneys. This was quite 
properly held to be a defective notice, since the 
attorneys no longer represented Lilian, her case having 
concluded in a final determination of the issues raised 
in the pleadings. The court reasoned that the charging 
order in Phillips amounted to a new claim, requiring new 
notice to be given. No such circumstances exist here. 
First National Bank of Denver v. District 
Court, 652 P. 2d 613 (Colo. 1982), a case also relied on 
by Bagley, is likewise distinguishable from the present 
case. First National Bank involved the modification of 
an earlier order charging the partnership interests of 
the judgment debtors. Such a modification would have had 
the effect of dissolving the partnership, and the 
Colorado court held that it did not comply with the 
statutory requirements for the dissolution of 
partnerships. Again, no such situation exists here, and 
the First National Bank case is inapplicable to the 
present controversy. 
In this case, Bagley was properly and timely 
notified that a charging order was being sought against 
him. He was present at the hearing on the motion, and 
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had ample opportunity to resist the motion at that time. 
That other partnersf and the partnership entity itself, 
were not notified is irrelevant in this context. 
Therefore, Bagley's contention that the charging order 
should be reversed is without merit. 
The lower court did not err in issuing the 
charging order without first sending notice to the non-
debtor partners. The notice sent to Bagley's counsel was 
adequate under the facts of the present case, and the 
order will not have an adverse impact on the remaining 
partners. Therefore, the failure to notify them does not 
require a reversal of the charging order. 
POINT II: A MOTION FOR A CHARGING ORDER IS NOT 
A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND SHOULD NOT 
BE TREATED AS ONE. 
Bagley's second contention appears to be that 
because a motion for a charging order bears some super-
ficial resemblance to a motion for summary judgment, it 
must conform to the requirements of Rule 56, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. No statutory or case authority is 
presented in support of this contention, apparently for 
the simple reason that there is none. The charging order 
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is based on a judgment previously entered against Mr. 
Bagley, and for that reason more closely resembles a writ 
of attachment or garnishment than a motion for summary 
judgment. Supporting affidavits/ interrogatories, 
depositions, and admissions are not necessary for the 
issuance of post-judgment remedies, and are only required 
under Rule 56 because summary judgment has the effect of 
depriving a party of trial on the merits. That situation 
does not exist here, and Bagley's contention should be 
rejected by the court. 
POINT III: THE CHARGING ORDER WAS NOT 
OVERLY BROAD. 
In contending that the charging order is too 
broad in its scope, Bagley likens the charging order to 
an assignment, but once again his emphasis is misplaced. 
A charging order has been defined as "a type of lien on 
[a partner's] interest in the firm." Blake v. Gilbert, 
702 P. 2d 631, 641 (Alaska 1985). A lien is a right to 
enforce a charge upon the property of another for payment 
or satisfaction of a claim, and cannot be construed to 
mean "sale," "transfer," "delivery," or "assignment." 
Vaughan v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 61 S. W. 2d 
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189, 190 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); see also Highland Park 
State Bank v. Salazary 555 S. W. 2d 484, 487 (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1987); Warren Tool Co. v. Stephenson, 161 N. W. 2d 
133, 142 (Mich. 1968). 
Since a charging order is a lien and not an 
assignment, the statutes cited by Bagley relating to the 
assignment of partnership interests are not applicable 
to the controversy now facing this court. The final 
question presented on appeal is whether the order itself 
is too broad, in that it requires the partnership itself 
to submit certain records to the court. 
Utah Code Ann. section 4 8-1-25 empowers the 
court issuing the charging order to "make all other 
orders, directions, accounts and inquiries which the 
debtor partner might have made or which the circumstances 
of the case may require." In effect, therefore, the 
court, for this limited purpose, steps into the position 
of the debtor partner. Other provisions of the Utah 
Uniform Partnership Act allow an individual partner 
unlimited access to the partnership books (section 48-1-
16), and the right to a formal account of partnership 
affairs (section 48-1-19). The charging order in this 
case does not seek information that would not be 
available to Mr. Bagley if he should request it himself. 
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If Bagley's interest in the partnership is to be applied 
toward satisfaction of the judgment against him, it 
follows that the court must determine the nature and 
extent of that interest, and the information sought by 
the order is reasonably related to that objective. 
CONCLDSION 
The charging order against Mr. Bagley was 
adequately grounded in existing substantive and procedur-
al law. There being no valid reason to overturn it, and 
the policy of the Court of Appeals being to defer to the 
discretion of the lower court except in cases of clear 
error, it follows that the charging order must be upheld. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
By: /? .\/Ut>y 'ZvLk 
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